5 things we learnt about countering disinformation
As the war in Ukraine continues into its eighth month, the Audley team joined the Aspen Institute at the Delegation of the European Union to the UK to discuss how we combat the disinformation spread by Russian actors. Here are five things we learnt:
The Aspen definition of disinformation is as follows: False or misleading information intentionally created or strategically amplified to mislead for a purpose.
1. Disinformation is just one tool in the Russian arsenal of information warfare
According to the panellists at the event, Russia’s underlying motive for using disinformation has always been the same: to sow information into society which weakens the public’s trust in Western institutions. This hasn’t changed since the Cold War.
What has changed is the end state. And their systematic and intentional activity to gain a strategic advantage within Ukraine.
Their approach is twofold. The first is the deliberate influencing of their domestic population to protect law and order and support their invasion. For instance, in the build-up to the invasion, we saw how Russia denied building up troops on Ukraine’s border. We have since seen footage of anti-war protestors being arrested and censorship of Russian press and foreign correspondents.
The second use of disinformation is about reinforcing ingrained societal narratives. It’s serving particular factions of society with content that reinforces their viewpoint and in turn, embeds deep structural divisions. For example, Australian researchers recently found that around 80% of tweets about the invasion in its early weeks were from fake ‘bot’ accounts online. They’re purposely used to drive up fear and reinforce pre-existing opinions within the Ukraine-Russia discourse.
Disinformation is part of Russia’s broader information warfare operation, whereby it seeks to gain a behavioural and attitudinal advantage. To butcher Carl Von Clausewitz: War is information by other means.
2. Disinformation’s ultimate opponent: Intelligence.
Andy Pryce, Head of Counter Disinformation at the Foreign and Commonwealth and Development Office who spoke on the panel said the relevant declassification of Government intelligence was crucial in countering disinformation in the lead-up to the invasion. With the UK government releasing more information to the public on Russia’s activity in Ukraine, individuals on social media sharing insights, Ukrainians sharing information, and journalists documenting on-the-ground activity, the information environment was dominated by Western narratives, rather than Russian. Unlike the 2008 annexation of Crimea.
Meanwhile, open-source intelligence (OSINT) could help bring Russian war criminals to justice in the future as OSINT (such as satellite imagery and data on Russian military leaders) paired with classified intel can help find those responsible and hold them to account.
However unpleasant viewing real-life drone strikes and on-the-ground atrocities may be, the videos circulating online and the subsequent international support for Ukraine, have hugely undermined Russia’s communications effort.
3. A range of methods are needed to fight in this information war
The information landscape we speak of is a constantly evolving sphere which requires a host of solutions working simultaneously. An increase in digital literacy is often one of the first policies cited, but alone this is ineffective.
Kriztina Stump, Head of Media Convergence and Social Media Unit, DG CNect, at the European Commission said there is simply no silver bullet. Though the 2022 Code of Practice on Disinformation will mean the ‘big players’ in the tech industry will have obligations to follow regarding fact-checking – otherwise they’ll face sanctions – these conglomerates are not singularly responsible for the spread of disinformation. Hostile state actors who are spreading disinformation have no motivation to follow such acts.
Independent and impartial journalism adds value to this cause. The BBC World Service programming in over 40 languages is a great tool in broadcasting a more balanced view of war to its audiences. Meanwhile, independent investigative journalism must be safeguarded both in Europe and Ukraine to ensure accurate war reports.
4. Countering disinformation within conflict should be a civic-centred approach backed by the state
Nataliya Popovych, Founder and President of One Philosophy and WeAreUkraine, spoke about the significance of legislation in her country which has meant KGB archives can be traced to recognise the methods Russia consistently uses. She mentioned the development of public bodies, such as the Ukrainian Culture Fund and Ukrainian Institute, which work together to combat Russian disinformation where it is most needed.
The panel reaffirmed the role of individuals in combatting disinformation. Permitting matters of national security, it is important that individuals and journalist groups investigate what we are seeing in Russia and Ukraine. This is essential for accurate and balanced reporting.
In addition, direct cyber operations against organisations that have criminal architectures should be explored by criminal investigation teams. Right now, malign actors have free reign to target whomever they choose to shape the online debate and real-life outcomes. With help from bodies such as the EU, we need to develop new ways of locating these people and stop them from causing disruption.
5. There is a battle: growth and revenue vs. integrity and safety
Speakers reiterated that it’s not necessarily the content itself that is damaging but the amplification which is what ultimately swings the pendulum in the battle for truth.
The inherent model of social media platforms prevents them from combatting this type of manipulation Carl Miller (Centre of Analysis for Social Media & CASM technology) argued there is not the political or commercial will to support the type of intervention required to make substantial change across these platforms. The suggestion was that there needs to be some substantive action in incentivising platforms to take action against disinformation pretty quickly.
Ideas included the involvement of criminal lawyers and consumer rights organisations to tackle disinformation-as-a-service and ‘buy-retweets’. This needs to be paired with rigorous evaluation and testing of effective methods for combatting the relatively small number of individuals using malign methods in the information space. The upskilling of the population’s digital literacy will not cut it - not in a constantly shifting environment.
The future of regulation will look very different to what we have now. For example, what happens when big tech companies are replaced by digital autonomous organisations, with no directors or owners for whom can be held accountable for their actions? The question is – are we really taking a step back and looking that far ahead? If not, the speakers argued, then we should be.
However, if we gleaned anything from this event it is that if we fail to take action on disinformation, today’s battle is nothing compared to tomorrow’s war.
By Sam Gilder, Researcher at Audley
Image credit/Lewis Ogde